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Abstract—The ability to exchange keys between users is vital in1
any wireless based security system, so a key generation technique2
exploits the randomness of the wireless channel is a promising3
alternative to existing key distribution techniques, e.g., public4
key cryptography. In this paper a secure key generation scheme5
based on the subcarriers’ channel responses over time in OFDM6
systems is proposed. We first implement a time-variant multipath7
channel with its channel impulse response modelled as a wide8
sense stationary (WSS) uncorrelated scattering random process9
and demonstrate that each subcarrier’s channel response is also a10
WSS random process. We then define the X% coherence time as11
the time required to produce an X% correlation coefficient in the12
autocorrelation function (ACF) of each channel tap, and find that13
when all the channel taps have the same Doppler power spectrum,14
each subcarrier’s channel response has the same ACF as the15
channel taps. The subcarrier’s channel response is therefore16
sampled every X% coherence time and quantized into key17
bits. We test all the key sequences’ randomness using National18
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite19
and the results indicate that the commonly used sampling interval20
as 50% coherence time cannot guarantee the randomness of the21
key sequence.22
I. INTRODUCTION23
Key generation from the randomness of the wireless chan-24
nel is currently receiving intensive attention in the research25
community because it can offer information theoretical secu-26
rity rather than computational security [1]. Traditionally, the27
distribution of the keys between different users is performed28
by public key cryptography, which depends on the computa-29
tional hardness and requires a key management infrastructure.30
However it is a major challenge for wireless sensor networks31
and ad hoc networks to accomplish this task as sensor nodes32
have limited computational budget and the distribution infras-33
tructure in ad hoc networks cannot always be guaranteed.34
The notion of generating keys from their common wireless35
channel to ensure privacy is a promising approach to establish36
private communication between legitimate users, Alice and37
Bob. In operation, Alice first sends a probing signal to Bob38
who will measure some physical modality through the received39
signal, e.g., received signal strength (RSS), phase, channel40
state information (CSI) etc. Bob then immediately sends a41
probing signal back to Alice who will also measure the same42
physical modality as Bob. The concept is then to generate43
keys from the highly correlated measurements at each side. 44
For indoor environment, the channel changes slowly so its 45
coherence time is quite large (of the order of 10 ms) in 46
comparison to the transmission time, therefore the channel 47
can be regarded as static during Alice and Bob’s measure- 48
ments. Thus, Alice and Bob can produce almost identical 49
measurements. Then, by waiting another coherence time to 50
do the next probing, they can obtain another measurement 51
that is uncorrelated with the previous. This is repeated until 52
enough measurements are obtained to be quantized into key 53
bits. Assuming that an eavesdropper, Eve, is more than a half 54
wavelength away from both Alice and Bob, then due to the 55
spatial decorrelation, the channel between Eve and Alice/Bob 56
is completely different from the channel between Alice and 57
Bob, so Eve cannot produce the same measurement results as 58
Alice or Bob. Thus Alice and Bob can establish a secret key 59
between each other that is unknown to Eve. 60
Theoretically, every physical modality related to the channel 61
randomness can be used for key generation, however RSS is 62
the most popular parameter. Most practical work is imple- 63
mented in IEEE 802.11 systems [2]–[4] or IEEE 802.15.4 64
systems [5]–[7] because RSS information is available in their 65
commercial network interface cards (NICs) or transceivers. 66
However RSS can only provide averaged channel informa- 67
tion, so we can only get one uncorrelated RSS from one 68
measurement within the coherence time. This results in a 69
low key generation rate (KGR) which limits its application 70
in cryptography. For example, the KGR from RSS reported 71
in [2] is only 1.3 bit/sec while advanced encryption standard 72
(AES) requires a key length at least 128 bits, which takes 73
approximately 2 minutes to generate a full key. Although there 74
exists an extended effort to improve the KGR by leveraging 75
MIMO [4] or multi-bit quantization [7], it cannot change the 76
fact that RSS is an averaged parameter and loses a lot of useful 77
channel information. 78
Some simulation work has been undertaken to generate the 79
key from the phase [8]–[10]. Specifically, Wang et al. [9] 80
proposed a phase based key generation scheme which can 81
measure multiple randomized phase information within a 82
single coherence time interval. Whilst their system does not 83
suffer from the low KGR problem, the accurate estimation of 84
the phase information limits its practical application in key85
generation.86
Alternatively, CSI, including channel impulse response87
(CIR) and channel frequency response (CFR) is a powerful88
tool and presents a promising application for key genera-89
tion [11], [12]. CSI is fine-grained channel information so it90
does not suffer from the same information loss, which leads91
to a higher achievable KGR than RSS based schemes [11].92
However, in the case of CIR based schemes [11], those channel93
taps with small magnitude are highly subject to noise, which94
results in a high key mismatch between Alice and Bob. Liu95
et al. [12] present a CFR based key generation scheme using96
the Intel 5300 WiFi card and reports a KGR of 60 bits/packet97
while the KGR of RSS based schemes with the same setting98
is only 2 bits/packet. However their work lacks theoretical99
modelling of the system or the channel.100
Previous work generating key from RSS or CSI claim that101
in order to guarantee the randomness of the key sequence,102
the measurement sampling interval should be larger than one103
coherence time [13], which is defined as the time over which104
the time correlation function is above 0.5 [14]. However,105
coherence time estimation is difficult in indoor environment106
as the Doppler spread is usually introduced by the moving of107
scattering objects rather than the transmitters or the receivers.108
It has been observed that whenever the experiments are109
actually performed, the authors usually just pick a time interval110
that is large enough so that their key sequence can pass the111
randomness test [12]. Thus, there is no evidence that sampling112
interval as coherence time will actually produce secure random113
keys.114
In this paper, an approach for generating the key bits115
securely from OFDM subcarriers’ channel responses is pro-116
posed. We implement a time-variant multipath channel model117
and IEEE 802.11 OFDM transceiver, and then generate keys118
from the subcarriers’ channel responses. Our work differs119
from the previous work, e.g. [12], in that we quantize the120
key from the channel response of each individual subcarrier121
over time rather than across all of them. This allows us to122
theoretically model a subcarrier’s channel response as a wide123
sense stationary (WSS) random process and then analyze the124
relationship between the randomness of the key and the corre-125
lation coefficient of the measurements. Our main contributions126
are summarized as follows:127
• We implement a time-variant multipath fading channel128
with its CIR as modelled a wide sense stationary uncorre-129
lated scattering (WSSUS) random process and show that130
each subcarrier’s channel response is also a WSS random131
process. Thus, while each subcarrier’s channel response132
is sampled by the same time interval, the measurements133
will have the same correlation relationship between each134
other. We further explore this concept to show that when135
all the channel taps are modelled by the same Doppler136
power spectrum, the subcarriers’ channel responses will137
have the same autocorrelation function (ACF) as the138
channel taps.139
• We explore the relationship between the correlation co-140
efficient of different sampled measurements and the ran- 141
domness of the key sequence generated from these mea- 142
surements. We extend the idea of the coherence time by 143
defining X% coherence time which is the time required 144
to make an X% correlation coefficient of the ACF of each 145
channel tap. We show that the commonly acknowledged 146
50% coherence time between different samples does not 147
guarantee the randomness of the quantized key bits. 148
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 149
models both the channel taps and subcarriers’ channel re- 150
sponses of the time-variant multipath channel as WSS ran- 151
dom processes. Section III defines the X% coherence time. 152
Section IV outlines the simulation model and presents the 153
performance of the model while Section V proposes the 154
subcarrier’s channel response based key generation scheme 155
and the randomness test results of the key sequence. Section VI 156
concludes the paper. 157
II. SYSTEM MODEL 158
A. Channel model 159
The wireless multipath channel can be modelled as a 160
linear time-varying system with a complex low-pass equiv- 161
alent response h(τ, t) [15]. If there are L discrete multipath 162
components, the output of the channel consists of the sum of 163
L delayed and attenuated versions of the input. Thus we have 164
y(t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl, t)x(t− τl), (1)
where h(τl, t) and τl are the complex attenuation and the delay 165
of the l-th multipath at time t, τl = lTs and Ts is the system’s 166
sampling period. 167
The CIR h(τ, t) is written as 168
h(τ, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl, t)δ(τ − τl). (2)
According to the central limit theorem, h(τl, t) can be approx- 169
imated as zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables, so 170
h(τl, t) ∼ CN (0, σ2h(l)). 171
In an OFDM system with B MHz channel spacing and M 172
evenly spaced subcarriers, the frequency of each subcarrier is 173
shown as 174
fm = m∆f, (3)
where m is the subcarrier index, −M2 + 1 ≤ m ≤ M2 and ∆f 175
is the frequency difference between two adjacent subcarriers, 176
∆f = BM . For example, in an IEEE 802.11 OFDM system 177
[16] with 20 MHz channel spacing, there are 64 subcarriers in 178
total (only 52 subcarriers are used to transmit data, the others 179
are used as guard bands), thus M = 64, B = 20 MHz and 180
∆f = BM = 312.5 kHz. 181
In an OFDM system, CFR H(f, t) and CIR h(τ, t) are an 182
FFT pair. We obtain H(f, t) by applying IFFT operation to 183
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Fig. 1. Channel frequency response at different time
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Fig. 2. H(f1, t), time variation of the 1-st subcarrier’s channel response
h(τ, t)184
H(fm, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl, t)exp(−j2pifmτl/M)
=
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl, t)exp(−j2pim∆flTs/M). (4)
Because h(τ, t) varies with time, H(fm, t) is also time-185
variant. A frequency selective fading channel’s frequency186
response at different time is shown in Fig. 1 and the 1-st187
subcarrier’s channel response over time H(f1, t) is shown in188
Fig. 2. As each channel tap h(τl, t) is modeled as a complex189
Gaussian process and H(fm, t) is a linear combination of190
h(τl, t), H(fm, t) is also a complex Gaussian random process,191
which can be used for key generation.192
B. WSS model193
1) WSSUS modelling of the multipath channel: The mod-194
elling of a rich scattering multipath channel as WSSUS was195
first proposed by Bello [17]. The time-varying nature of the196
channel is modelled mathematically by treating h(τ, t) as a197
WSS random process in t with an ACF [15]198
Rh(τi, τj ,∆t) = E [h(τi, t)
∗h(τj , t+ ∆t)] . (5)
In most multipath channels, the attenuation and phase shift199
associated with different delays (i.e., paths) are assumed to be200
uncorrelated. This uncorrelated scattering (US) assumptions201
leads to202
Rh(τi, τj ,∆t) = Rh(τi,∆t)δ(τi − τj), (6)
where δ(·) is a Dirac delta function.203
Equation (6) embodies both the WSS and US assumptions.204
It is often referred to as the WSSUS model for fading. This205
ACF is denoted by Rh(τ,∆t) and is given by 206
Rh(τ,∆t) = E [h(τ, t)
∗h(τ, t+ ∆t)] . (7)
2) WSS modelling of the subcarriers’ channel responses: 207
The channel response of m-th subcarrier is given in equation 208
(4). The mean value and ACF can be calculated as 209
E [H(fm, t)] =
L−1∑
l=0
E [h(τl, t)] exp(−j2pifmτl/M)
= 0, (8)
and 210
RH(fm, t1, t2) = E [H(fm, t1)
∗H(fm, t2)]
=
L−1∑
l=0
L−1∑
i=0
E [h(τl, t1)
∗h(τi, t2)] exp(j2pifmTs(l − i)/M).
(9)
As h(τ, t) is modelled as WSSUS, equation (9) can be 211
simplified to 212
RH(fm,∆t) =
L−1∑
l=0
E [h(τl, t)
∗h(τl, t+ ∆t)] . (10)
The mean value of H(fm, t) is a constant and its ACF only 213
depends on the time delay, thus channel response H(fm, t) is 214
a WSS random process. So when we sample H(fm, t) by the 215
same time interval, all the adjacent sampled points will have 216
the same correlation coefficient between each other. 217
III. COHERENCE TIME AND CORRELATION 218
Coherence time is a statistical measure of the time duration 219
over which the CIR is essentially invariant and quantifies the 220
similarity of the channel response [14]. It can be quantified 221
through channel’s correlation relationship at different times 222
and usually is defined as the time over which the correlation 223
function is above 50%. 224
In a multipath channel, each channel tap can have a different 225
Doppler power spectrum. The power spectral density (PSD) 226
and the ACF of the fading process form an FFT pair. The 227
normalized ACF of the l-th tap can be given as: 228
Rh(τl,∆t) =
E [h(τl, t)
∗h(τl, t+ ∆t)]
E [|h(τl, t)|2] . (11)
The X% coherence time [18] is defined as that value of 229
Tc,X%(τl) such that the correlation coefficient is X%, i.e., 230
Rh(τl, Tc,X%(τl)) =
X
100
. (12)
In some Doppler power spectrum models, e.g., Jakes model, 231
the ACF is not a monotonic function, so there will be several 232
∆t for some correlation coefficients. We use the first ∆t which 233
sets the correlation coefficient X% as Tc,X%(τl). 234
When all the channel taps are modelled as the same Doppler 235
power spectrum, then all the channel taps have the same ACF, 236
so we can get: 237
Rh(τl,∆t) = Rh(∆t), l = 0, 1, ..., L− 1, (13)
Tc,X%(τl) = Tc,X%, l = 0, 1, ..., L− 1. (14)
The normalized ACF of m-th subcarrier’s channel response238
can be written as239
RH(fm,∆t) =
E[H(fm, t)
∗H(fm, t+ ∆t)]
E[|H(fm, t)|2]
=
∑L−1
l=0 E[h(τl, t)
∗h(τl, t+ ∆t)]∑L−1
l=0 E[|h(τl, t)|2]
=
∑L−1
l=0 E[Rh(τl,∆t)|h(τl, t)|2]∑L−1
l=0 E[|h(τl, t)|2]
=
Rh(∆t)
∑L−1
l=0 E[|h(τl, t)|2]∑L−1
l=0 E[|h(τl, t)|2]
= Rh(∆t). (15)
Thus the subcarrier’s channel response has the same ACF as240
the channel taps and is independent of subcarrier index m. All241
the subcarriers’ channel responses have the same ACF as242
RH(∆t) = Rh(∆t). (16)
If we extend the concept of coherence time to the subcarrer’s243
channel response, then when all the channel taps have the244
same Doppler power spectrum, all the subcarriers’ channel245
responses have the same coherence time as the channel taps.246
IV. SIMULATION MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND247
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS248
A. Simulation model249
A transceiver model is implemented in Matlab based on250
IEEE 802.11 OFDM [16]. The channel is modelled as a251
time-variant multipath fading channel [19]. All the channel252
taps are modelled as independent complex Gaussian random253
variables whose average power follows the exponential power254
delay profile and a Bell-shaped Doppler power spectrum [20].255
The normalized Bell-shaped Doppler power spectrum can be256
expressed (in linear values, not dB values) as257
S(f) =
√
A/(pifd)
1 +A( ffd )
2
, (17)
where A is a constant, in IEEE 802.11 channel, A = 9 and258
fd is the Doppler spread, whose values were found to be259
up to approximately 6 Hz at 5.25 GHz center frequency and260
up to approximately 3 Hz at 2.4 GHz center frequency by261
experiments in indoor environment [20].262
The ACF of the Bell-shaped Doppler spectrum is given as263
R(∆t) = exp(−2pifd√
A
∆t). (18)
So the 50% coherence time can be calculated as264
Tc,50% =
√
A
2pifd
ln2. (19)
The Doppler spread fd is 6 Hz in the simulation. We use265
20 MHz channel spacing and 20 MHz sampling frequency for266
the IEEE 802.11 OFDM model. Every 0.8 ms Alice sends a267
probing signal to Bob who will record the CFR. Then Bob268
sends a probing signal to Alice who will record the CFR as269
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well. We run the simulation for equivalently 400 s so there are 270
500,000 measurements in total. The theoretical 50% coherence 271
time calculated by (19) is 56 ms so the total simulation time 272
is long enough to represent the channel variation. 273
B. ACF and WSS property of the simulation model 274
We calculate several channel taps and subcarriers’ ACF and 275
the results are shown in Fig. 3. All the channel taps have 276
almost the same ACF, showing a high consistence of the 277
simulation model. All the subcarriers have almost the same 278
ACF as the channel taps because all the taps are modelled 279
as the same Doppler power spectrum, which is also shown 280
analytically in (15) . 281
The WSS property of the simulation model is evaluated 282
by comparing two ACFs observed at different times. In the 283
example shown in Fig. 4, t′0 = t0 + 10 s, the ACF of 284
channel taps and subcarriers does not vary with the observation 285
time. The WSS property of the channel guarantees that the 286
correlation relationship between different sampling data only 287
depends on their sampling time difference. Thus we can make 288
sure that all the adjacent data sampled by the same time 289
interval will have the same correlation relationship between 290
each other. 291
V. FREQUENCY RESPONSE BASED KEY GENERATION 292
A. Quantization 293
Quantization is the method to convert the measurements 294
into key bits. Different schemes differ in the quantization 295
level and threshold. Cumulative distribution function (CDF) 296
based quantization is frequently used in key generation [7], 297
[12]. The threshold is chosen according to the cdf of the 298
TABLE I
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF H(f1, t) SAMPLED BY DIFFERENT X% COHERENCE TIME
Correlation coefficient X% 50% 40% 30% 20% 15% 12% 10% 9% 7%
Tc,X%(s) 0.0832 0.096 0.1104 0.1328 0.1552 0.1992 0.2232 0.2312 0.2456
Sequence length 4760 4166 3622 3012 2576 2008 1792 1730 1628
Frequency 0.7942 0.8042 0.7904 0.9129 0.9372 0.8583 0.7768 0.7364 0.8043
Block frequency 0.0734 0.0142 0.5148 0.2217 0.3898 0.6528 0.9615 0.8183 0.8906
Runs 0 0 0 0 0.0014 0.7894 0.6379 0.1119 0.7275
Longest run of ones 0 0 0.0073 0.0061 0.1237 0.8042 0.5978 0.2257 0.7489
DFT 0.0034 0.1229 0.3254 0.0262 0.9136 0.5123 0.0564 0.6994 0.3281
Serial 0 0 0 0.0311 0.3526 0.6656 0.0584 0.9481 0.256
0 0.6715 0.1282 0.3259 0.8062 0.9309 0.32 0.9778 0.4512
Approximate entropy 0 0 0 0.0024 0.0484 0.2643 0.0296 0.2217 0.0131
Cumulative Sums(fwd) 0.9387 0.7382 0.802 0.9029 0.8424 0.8117 0.7024 0.8618 0.7297
Cumulative Sums(fwd) 0.7237 0.5147 0.9108 0.9662 0.9049 0.6458 0.9386 0.8994 0.5073
measurements, which can be made to guarantee the proportion299
of 0s and 1s are equally the same, a very important feature300
for a random sequence. In addition, it is very flexible as it301
can be used as either single-bit or multi-bit quantization. In302
our system, single-bit cdf based quantization is adopted to303
quantize Alice and Bob’s m-th subcarrier’s channel response304
H(fm, t) into key bits, which is detailed in Algorithm 1; K305
is the quantization level.
Algorithm 1 CDF based quantization algorithm
1: F (x) = P (H(fm, t) < x)
2: ηk = F
−1( k
2K
), k = 1, 2, ..., 2K − 1
3: η0 = −∞
4: η2K =∞
5: Construct Gray code bk and assign them to different
intervals [ηk−1, ηk]
6: key(n,K) = bk, if ηk−1 ≤ H(fm, tn) < ηk
306
B. Information reconciliation and privacy amplification307
There can be mismatch between the key generated in Alice308
and Bob due to the noise, hardware difference etc. Information309
reconciliation is used to correct the key discrepancy, either310
using error correcting codes or some interactive information311
reconciliation protocols [3]. In our scheme, secure sketch [21]312
is employed to make Alice and Bob agree on the same key.313
Some information is publicly transmitted between Alice and314
Bob in the information reconciliation stage, which can also be315
heard by Eve. So privacy amplification using universal hash316
function is employed to remove the revealed information.317
C. Randomness test318
We use a statistical test suite provided by National Institute319
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [22] to evaluate the ran-320
domness of the key bit generated from the subcarrier’s channel321
response, which is commonly employed in key generation [2],322
[3], [10], [12], [23].323
There are 15 tests in total. The null hypothesis under test is324
that the sequence being tested is random. All the tests return a325
P -value which summarizes the strength of the evidence against326
the null hypothesis. When the P -value is larger than the chosen327
significance level (α), the sequence is accepted as random. 328
Typically, α is chosen in the range [0.001, 0.01]. In this paper, 329
α is chosen as 0.01. Some tests require an extremely long 330
sequence, e.g., several tests recommend the input sequence 331
length larger than 106, which is currently not available in the 332
simulation, thus we run 8 tests, half of all the 15 tests, which 333
still satisfies NIST’s requirements [22]. 334
We calculate each subcarrier’s X% coherence time, Tc,X%, 335
through its ACF, and then sample the H(fm, t) every Tc,X% 336
time over the entire 400 s simulation time. We generate a 337
relatively long sequence in order to draw a more reliable 338
conclusion on the randomness of the key sequence. We test 339
all the sampled sequences with NIST’s statistical test suite and 340
compare their results; an example is shown in Table I. All the 341
cells highlighted in grey are those failing the test (P -value 342
< 0.01). 343
The poor performance on the “runs” test concurs with 344
intuition. A run is an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits 345
and the focus of the “runs” test is the total number of runs in 346
the sequence. When the sample time is small, the channel is 347
highly correlated, as the subcarrier’s channel response has a 348
high possibility that the next sample’s amplitude has the same 349
sign; thus it is quantized into the same bits whenever single-bit 350
quantization is used, which results in less runs. 351
In previous work, any two channels that are separated by 352
the coherence time is considered as uncorrelated [14] and 353
usually 50% coherence time is used. However, it may be 354
observed from the randomness test results, that it actually 355
requires a correlation coefficient smaller than 50% between 356
different samples in order to make the quantized key bits pass 357
the NIST statistical randomness test. 358
D. Discussion 359
We have proposed a key generation scheme based on a 360
particular subcarrier’s frequency response over time. Channel 361
frequency response is a good representation of the channel. 362
We can simultaneously extract the key from several subcarri- 363
ers’ channel responses. Each generated key sequence can be 364
concatenated to form a longer sequence or used independently 365
for different applications. Key generation based on subcarrier’s 366
channel response has several advantages. Compared with RSS 367
based key generation, there are more than one subcarrier’s368
channel response available for extraction, which offers a369
potential to achieve much higher KGR. Compared with phase370
based key generation, channel estimation in OFDM system is371
quite mature and so the subcarrier’s channel response is easier372
to obtain than phase information, and with a higher accuracy.373
Thus compared to RSS and phase based schemes, subcarriers’374
channel responses based key generation is more applicable to375
practical application in cryptography.376
VI. CONCLUSION377
In this paper, we propose a key generation scheme that378
extracts keys from the subcarriers’ channel responses. To the379
best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that tests380
the randomness of the key sequences generated from mea-381
surements sampled by different X% coherence time. Current382
research that uses RSS and CSI for key generation proposes383
using a figure of 50% coherence time as the time to sample384
the channel. However, we find that using 50% coherence time385
cannot guarantee the randomness of the key sequence. We386
have modelled both the channel taps and subcarriers’ channel387
response as WSS random processes and find they have the388
same ACF when all the channel taps have the same Doppler389
power spectrum. We sample a particular subcarrier’s channel390
response H(fm, t) by X% coherence time and quantize the391
sampled measurements into key bits, whose randomness is392
tested by NIST’s randomness statistical test suite. Coherence393
time estimation of an indoor environment, and implementation394
of our scheme based on WARP system will be the focus of395
our future work.396
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